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The Limits of Corporate Rights
Under International Law
Julian G. Ku*
Abstract
For most commentators, the acceptance of corporate rights under international human
rights law is part of a broader push to recognize corporations as subjects of international law.
As subjects, corporations would not only enjoy some international legal rights, but they would
also be liable for many international legal duties. In prior work, I have critiiZed the effort to
impose international legal duties on corporations in the context of the Alien Tort Statute,
arguing that there is insufficient international consensus to treat corporations as subjects of
international law. In this Article, I critidie the parallel effort to treat corporations as subjects
that enjoy international legal rights. I do not argue that corporations can never hold legal rights
under international law. But the manner in which corporations have acquired r ghts in certain
bodies of international law does not support the goal of recognizing corporations as "subjects" of
customary international law. For these reasons, business corporations generally enjoy rghts
under international law when such rights are explidtly authoriZed through formal lawmaking
processes such as international treaties or national statutes. There is very little support for
recognizing such rights under general customary international law. In some limited cases,
treaties without plain language granting corporate rights might still be interpreted to do so, but
only fsuch protection were deemed necessat to protect the rights of naturalpersons.
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Law Interest Group for selecting this article to be presented at their Fall 2010 workshop at the
University of Minnesota. The paper benefited from many comments from participants at that
conference. The author would also like to thank Bethany Eroh-Simmons for outstanding research
assistance and Mary Godfrey-Rickards for excellent library support. This article was supported by
a research grant from the Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Few US Supreme Court decisions have sparked as much controversy in
recent years as Citizens United v Federal Election Commission,' which extended free
speech guarantees under the US Constitution to business corporations, unions,
and other legally created entities. The decision in that case to give business
corporations free speech rights has been decried by President Obama as well as
by numerous scholars and activists.2 Indeed, the decision has proved so
unpopular that one US congressman has even suggested impeaching Chief
1 130 S Ct 876 (2010).
2 See, for example, Laurence H. Tribe, What Should Congress Do About Citizens United?
(SCOTUSblog Jan 24, 2010), online at http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/01/what-should-
congress-do-about-citizens-united/ (visited Oct 13, 2011).
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Justice Roberts.3 It is safe to say that the protection of corporations through
individual rights provisions has been, and remains, a controversial question for
US constitutional lawyers.4
It is therefore curious that the protection of corporations under public
international law, even international human rights law, has drawn relatively little
attention and almost no debate among international lawyers. Corporations have
long enjoyed protection under international laws protecting foreign investors.
Similarly, courts in Europe have long recognized that corporations enjoy many
protections under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).' The
few scholars who have considered the question of corporate rights under
international law have almost uniformly endorsed extending this approach to
other international human rights instruments, such as the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).6
For most of these commentators, the acceptance of corporate rights under
international human rights law is part of a broader push to recognize
corporations as subjects of international law. As subjects, corporations would
not only enjoy some international legal rights, but they would also be liable for
many international legal duties.'
In prior work, I have criticized the effort to impose international legal
duties on corporations in the context of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), arguing
3 Robert Barnes, Impeachment Calls Part of Life for a Supreme CourtJustice, But Few Get Very Far, Wash
Post A19 (Oct 31, 2010); John Nichols, Congressman Considers Move to Impeach Chief Justice John
Roberts, (The Nation Oct 25, 2010), online at
http://www.thenation.com/blog/1 55545/congressman-considers-move-impeach-chief-justice-
john-roberts (visited Oct 14, 2011).
4 Criticism of corporate constitutional rights has a long pedigree in US academic literature. See, for
example, Carl J. Mayer, Personalizng the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 Hastings L J
577 (1990) (discussing why the Supreme Court only recently granted Bill of Rights protections to
corporations and focusing specifically on domestic corporations); Larry May, The Morality of Groups
144-55 (Notre Dame 1987) (arguing that corporations are not entitled to the same human rights
protections as individuals under the US Constitution because corporations are not equivalent to
human beings, using the example of First National Bank v Bellotti, 435 US 765 (1978), though not
discussing multinational corporations in much detail).
5 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), 213 UN
Treaty Set 221 (1953) (ECHR).
6 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UN Treaty Ser 171 (1966) (ICCPR).
Only a few scholars have directly considered the issue of corporations' rights. See, for example,
Marius Emberland, The Human Rights of Companies: Exploring the Structure of ECHR Protection
(Oxford 2006); Lucien J. Dhooge, Human Rights for Transnational Corporations, 16 J Transnatl L &
Poly 197 (2007); Michael K. Addo, The Corporation as Victim of Human Rights Violations, in Michael
K. Addo, ed, Human Rights Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations 187 (Kluwer
1999).
7 See, for example, Dhooge, 16 J Transnatl L & Poly at 200 (cited in note 6); Addo, The Corporation
as Victim at 189 (cited in note 6).
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that there is insufficient international consensus to treat corporations as subjects
of international law.' In this Article, I criticize the parallel effort to treat
corporations as subjects that enjoy international legal rights. I do not argue that
corporations can never hold legal rights under international law. But the manner
in which corporations have acquired rights in certain bodies of international law
does not support the goal of recognizing corporations as "subjects" of
customary international law.
Importantly, corporate rights have almost always been granted as a result
of specific textual authorization in a particular treaty or convention. There is
little if any basis for deriving such rights from customary law and state practice.
Second, the corporate rights movement elides serious practical and
functional challenges. The most serious problem is the determination of whether
passive investors or management may assert such rights on behalf of the
corporation. But claims of corporate rights also face difficulties in the sheer
diversity of national laws under which corporations are registered and operated.
This diversity is further complicated by the rise of different kinds of business
associations-including limited partnerships, limited liability corporations, trusts,
non-profit institutions, and professional corporations-that may or may not
have the kind of legal personality typically required for corporate rights to exist.
These problems can be handled better by a process of treaty-making, which
allows states to make variations for particular rights, corporate forms, and other
circumstances.
For these reasons, this Article argues that business corporations generally
enjoy rights under international law only when such rights are explicitly
authorized through formal lawmaking processes such as international treaties or
national statutes. There is very little support for recognizing such rights under
general customary international law. In some limited cases, treaties without plain
language granting corporate rights might still be interpreted to do so, but only if
such protection was deemed necessary to protect the rights of natural persons.
Ironically, this formal and perhaps restrictive approach to corporate rights
is best exemplified by the area of international law perceived as the most friendly
to and protective of business corporations: international investment law.
Corporate rights under international law seem to have originated in treaties
granting diplomatic protection to foreign investors. This tradition of making
explicit and specific references to the protection of corporations is uniformly
reflected in modern investment protection treaties. By contrast, international
human rights treaties rarely make explicit reference to corporations or legal
persons. Yet it is under these human rights laws that corporations have
8 See generally Julian G. Ku, The Curious Case of Corporate Liabikly Under the Alien Tort Statute: A
Flawed System ofjudicalLawmaking, 51 VaJ Intl L 353 (2011).
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increasingly sought (and received) protection and where academic support for
corporate rights has been increasing.
In Section II, I consider the academic literature on the status of
corporations under international law and its relation to the recognition of
corporate rights. In Section III.A, I turn to international law and trace the
origins of international corporate rights in the law of diplomatic protection. In
Section III.B, I trace the development of corporate rights under international
investment treaties concluded after World War II. In Section IV, I then discuss
the recognition of corporate rights under international human rights law.
I conclude in Section V that neither international investment law nor
international human rights law supports the treatment of corporations as full,
rights-holding subjects of general international law. Both bodies of law rely on
formal textual indications to support corporate rights. Moreover, the
development of corporate rights in these areas of law suggests that there are
significant pragmatic and functional difficulties in recognizing corporate rights.
The first relates to the difficulty of distinguishing between the rights of investors
and of managers in a corporation. Second, I suggest that national laws creating
corporations and other business associations vary too much to sustain an easy
equivalence between corporations and natural persons. Both of these reasons
counsel in favor of the formal approach and against the broader conception of
full corporate subjecthood under international law.
II. SUBJECTS, RIGHTS, AND DUTIES
A. Subjects and International Law
It is axiomatic that traditional international law treats states as its exclusive
subjects. In the view of this traditional conception, only states had international
legal personality and the capability to assert rights and to bear duties under
international law. As the Permanent Court of International Justice noted in the
Danzig Railway Officials decision, "[i]t may be readily admitted that, according to a
well-established principle of international law ... an international agreement,
cannot, as such, create direct rights and obligations for private individuals."'
In this traditional conception, individual human beings and other non-state
entities simply did not exist on the international plane. Their agreements with
states were not governed by international law and they held no right to assert
claims under international law. Only states, invoking their sovereign rights of
diplomatic protection, could make claims on behalf of their nationals against
9 Jurirdiction of the Courts of Dantg, Advisory Opinion No 15, 1928 PCIJ (Ser B) No 15, 17 (Mar 3,
1928).
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other states. On the other hand, non-state actors owed no duties under
international law either. States could be held responsible under international law
for the acts of their nationals, or at least those nationals acting on behalf of their
states.
This clear but formalistic limitation on subjects began to break down in the
twentieth century. According to Antonio Cassese, the first crack in the
subjecthood wall occurred in the law of armed conflict, when individuals who
violated the laws of war were held liable, regardless of their status as agents of
their state.'o Conversely, individual victims of war crimes acquired the "right"
under international law not to suffer war crimes, regardless of their nationality."
Eventually, the aftermath of World War II accelerated the rise of non-state
players on the international plane. The three most important new characters in
the "dramatis personae" were international organizations, individuals, and
national liberation movements.' 2 All of these new "subjects" of international law
began gradually to acquire the power to interact with states on the international
plane. For instance, in the Reparations Case, the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) recognized that an international organization like the UN has the authority
under international law to seek redress against states.
Similarly, individuals won a wide variety of rights in a series of postwar
international human rights treaties. International human rights law represented
the most important conceptual shift in general international law. Not only did
international human rights law allow individuals to invoke rights against certain
kinds of treatment by foreign states, but such rights could be invoked against an
individual's own state as well.
The idea that an individual can have rights directly under international law,
an idea dismissed in Danzg Railway Offidials, had become conventional wisdom
by the end of the twentieth century, even in areas of law outside of human
rights. In the LaGrand Case,14 the ICJ stated, without any discussion, that
individuals are also subjects of international law for the purposes of invoking
rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.s
10 Antonio Cassese, InternationalLaw 245-50 (Oxford 2002).
11 Id at 70.
12 Id at 168-85.
13 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Sernce of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 ICJ 174,
177-79 (Apr 11, 1949).
14 LaGrand Case (Ger v US) 2001 ICJ 466 (June 27, 2001).
'5 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 21 UST 77, 596 UN Treaty Ser 261 (1963). LaGrand
Case, 2001 ICJ at 494. See also Andrew Clapham, The Role of the Individual in International Law, 21
Euro J Intl L 25, 28 (2010).
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To be sure, the importance of non-state actors to the international legal
system continues to be debated. One leading authority, Ian Brownlie, has
maintained that states remain the primary subject of international relations and
that this would only change "if national entities, as political and legal systems,
were absorbed in a world state."" Moreover, even if non-state actors such as
individuals have rights and duties, their ascendance to full "subjecthood" is not
necessarily complete. 17
Despite this skepticism, the status of non-state actors under international
law and relations remains an area of substantial academic interest and public
activity. In particular, focus has shifted beyond human beings, the "subjects" of
international law in areas of armed conflict or human rights, and toward other
non-state entities. As Philip Alston suggests, this includes "transnational
corporations and other large-scale business entities, private voluntary groups
such as churches, labour unions, and human rights groups, and [ ] international
organizations including the United Nations itself, the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization."'
B. Business Corporations and International Law
Of these new characters on the international law stage, none have drawn
more attention than transnational business corporations. The academic interest
in the international status of corporations began as early as the 1970s, but
accelerated in the 1990s with two important developments. First, corporations
became subject to civil lawsuits in the United States under the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS)." In these litigations, dozens of major corporations were alleged to have
violated customary international law, usually under the theory that the
corporation aided and abetted a government in the commission of humanitarian
atrocities.20
16 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 58 (Oxford 5th ed 1998), quoting Wolfgang
Friedman, The Changing Structure of International Law 213 (Columbia 1964).
17 Philip Alston, The Not-a-Cat' Syndrome: Can the International Human Rghts Regime Accommodate Non-
State Actors?, in Philip Alston, ed, Non-State Actors and Human Rights 3, 19-20 (Oxford 2005).
's Id at 6.
19 62 Stat 934 (1948), codified at 28 USC §1350 (ATS). This provision was originally enacted as part
of the Judiciary Act of 1789. In recent decades, it has been the basis for lawsuits in federal courts
alleging violations of customary international law. See Sosa v Alvare!-Machain, 542 US 692, 712-13
(2004).
20 The viability of these lawsuits against corporations has been rejected by one United States court.
See Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F3d 111 (2d Cir 2010), cert granted Kiobel v Royal Dutch
Petroleum (Oct 17, 2011), and upheld by three appeals courts, Doe v ExxonMobil (DC Cir 2011),
Flomo v Firestone (7th Cir 2011), and Sarei v Rio Tinto (9th Cir 2011). The Supreme Court will decide
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Second, the various organs of the UN began to facilitate a number of
reports and studies on the duties and responsibilities of business corporations
under international law. The two most noteworthy efforts are the Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights, released in 2003 by the UN Commission on Human Rights21 and
the Promotion ofAll Human Rghts, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Including the Right to Development, released in 2009 by the UN Secretary-General.22
Both reports sought, in different ways, to promote norms and legal mechanisms
to regulate the conduct of transnational corporations under international law.
Although neither report purported to codify legal rules, both represented an
important step in the process of considering whether and how to impose legal
duties on corporations under international law.
The rise of corporate ATS litigation and the actions of the UN organs have
been accompanied by a voluminous literature on corporate duties under
international law. This literature has largely focused on the question of corporate
duties and responsibilities." As a starting point, most commentators observe
that domestic regulation seems inadequate to regulate modern transnational
corporations. International law therefore has become an important and
necessary source of law to restrain and control them. Professor Jordan Paust, for
instance, rejects the "pretense of exclusion" for all non-state actors, including
business corporations.24 Professor Ralph Steinhardt has conceptualized this
whole trend as a new "lex mercatoria" of civil liability, national regulations, and
the corporate liability issue in 2012. For a defense of this position, see generally Ku, 51 VaJ Intl L
353 (cited in note 8).
21 UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights,
UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003).
22 UN Human Rights Council, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, Promotion of All
Human Rights, Civil, Political Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, UN
Doc A/HRC/11/13 (2009).
23 See, for example, Menno T. Kamninga and Saman Zia-Zarifi, eds, Liabifty of Mulinational
Corporations Under International Law (Kluwer 2000); Sarah Joseph, Corporations and Transnadonal
Human Rights Litigation (Hart 2004); Nicola Jagers, Corporate Human Rights Obligations: In Search of
Accountability (Intersentia 2002) (focusing on the human rights obligations of corporations and the
avenues for enforcement and implementation of human rights norms with respect to
corporations); Stephen Bottomley, Corporations and Human Rights, in Stephen Bottomley and David
Kinley, eds, Commerdal Law and Human Rights 47 (Ashgate 2002); Sol Picciotto, Rights,
Responsibidlies and Regulation of International Business, 42 Colum J Transnatl L 131 (2003).
24 Jordan J. Paust, Nonstate Actor Particpation in International Law and the Pretense of Exclusion, 51 Va J
Intl L 977, 987-89 (2011).
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"soft" international norms.25 Others have simply argued for requiring
corporations to respect human rights law, or at least jus cogens norms, to the
same degree as states must.26
A few commentators have also examined the related question of corporate
rights under international law. Like the commentators on corporate duties,
scholars have also been almost wholly in favor of corporate nights under
international law.
Indeed, the main justification for corporate rights is closely linked to
arguments in favor of corporate duties. Contemporary corporations operate on
the international plane. They often engage in large-scale cross-border
investments, often in partnership with sovereign governments. Given the
tremendous economic size of many contemporary business corporations, their
actions can be just as significant, if not more significant, than those of many
sovereign governments. Because of modern corporations' international scale and
importance, scholars have argued that corporations deserve international legal
personality.
Moreover, as a number of scholars have stressed, recognizing that
corporations enjoy rights can have beneficial effects on the development of
certain areas of international law. Professor Lucien Dhooge, for instance, has
argued that "[c]oncurrent recognition of freedoms and guarantees imbues
human rights law with enhanced standing. Such recognition is essential in
convincing corporations to appreciate human rights and their responsibilities." 27
Given the passion with which most scholars have argued in favor of imposing
duties on corporations, it is not surprising that this justification for promoting
corporate rights, especially under international human rights law, has drawn the
most support. As Professor Harold Koh has written in an essay sharply
criticizing opposition to the imposition of corporate duties, "[ilf corporations
have rights .. . they must have duties" under international law.28
25 Ralph G. Steinhardt, Corporate Responsibiity and the International Law of Human Rights: The New Lex
Mercatoria, in Alston, ed, Non-State Actors and Human Rights at 177 (cited in note 17).
26 See Olivier De Schutter, The Accountability of Mulinationals for Human Rights Violations in European
Law, in Alston, ed, Non-State Actors and Human Rights at 235-40 (cited in note 17).
27 Dhooge, 16 J Transnatl L & Poly at 200 (cited in note 6).
28 Harold Hongju Koh, Separating Myth from Reaoy about Corporate Responsibiiy Lintation,7 J Intl Econ
L 263, 265 (2004) (discussing several challenges to ATS corporate claims, particularly by
conceptualizing the corporate person and the legal basis for liability in civil claims). See also
Ronald C. Slye, Corporations, Veils, and International CriminalLiabity, 33 Brooklyn ] Intl L 955, 958
(2008) (noting in the background section of the article that corporations enjoy rights within
human rights treaties as well as under the North American Free Trade Agreement); Paust, 51 Va J
Intl L at 985-99 (cited in note 24) (arguing that corporations have long been recognized as
subjects of international law, carrying both duties and rights).
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In sum, academic commentary has tentatively endorsed the recognition of
corporations as subjects under international law. Such analysis is usually focused
on questions of whether and in what ways corporations owe duties under
international law. But there is also decided support for recognizing corporate
rights under international law, especially under international human rights law.
The main justification for such recognition lies in a slowly but discernibly
growing consensus in favor of granting business corporations the status of
"subjects" under general international law.
III. THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS FOR
CORPORATIONS
The tentative academic consensus in favor of corporate rights can point to
some formal legal precedents for support. For instance, corporations have won
direct rights in certain areas of international law. Most prominently, business
corporations have long exercised rights granted under international investment
treaties to arbitrate disputes with foreign sovereigns related to their investments
and business operations. These rights originated in an earlier generation of
claims settlement and "Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation" (FCN) treaties
that recognized companies as a distinct set of individuals worthy of diplomatic
protection. In this section, I trace the origins of corporate rights in this earlier
generation of FCN treaties and then consider their further development in
contemporary international investment treaties.
A. Business Corporations and the Law of Diplomatic
Protection
Although business corporations have existed for hundreds of years, the
modern corporation probably traces its origins back only to the mid-nineteenth
century. Earlier corporations, such as those chartered by the British government
to carry out state monopolies in trade or to establish colonies, were special
dispensations from the government for specific purposes. In some ways, those
corporations were understood to simply be privately financed arms of the state."
By contrast, modern corporations are created through a formalistic
registration process and are typically authorized to conduct any lawful business.
Most importantly, modern business corporations are typically recognized as legal
29 See Phillip I. Blumberg, The Mulinational Challenge to Corporation Law: The Search for a New Personality
5-6 (Oxford 1993); Gregory A. Mark, Comment, The Personficaion of the Business Corporaion in
American Law, 54 U Chi L Rev 1441, 1452-53 (1987). See also Mark Bovens, The Corporate Republic:
Complex OrganiZadions and Cii.Zenship, in Emilios A. Christodoulidis, ed, Communitarianism and
CitiZenship 158, 160-64 (Ashgate 1998).
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persons for the purposes of domestic law. As legal persons, modern business
corporations can engage in legal transactions separately from their investors and
managers.
This evolution in the status of corporations is reflected in their treatment
in early treaties of the US. The first mention of "companies" or "corporations"
can be found in FCN treaties. These agreements typically established preferential
trading relationships to facilitate trade between nationals of the two states.
Corporations were not at this time typically considered nationals needing
protection, but more like agents acting on behalf of or under state authority.30
As such agents of the states, their actions would be regulated to ensure they
conformed to the preferential trading terms guaranteed by the treaties.31
The reconception of corporations as independent legal persons was
confirmed in the US by the well-known Supreme Court decision Trustees of
Dartmouth College v Woodward.32 It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that by the
middle of the nineteenth century, treaties began to protect corporations in the
same way that they sought to protect individual human beings. For instance, an
1853 treaty between the US and Great Britain explicitly recognized the ability of
companies and corporations, as well as individuals, to bring claims against
sovereigns due to injuries suffered during the War of 1812.
The High Contracting Parties agree that all claims on the part of
corporations, companies, or private individuals, citizens of the United
States, upon the Government of her Britannic Majesty, and all claims on the
part of corporations, companies, or private individuals, subjects of her Britannic
Majesty, upon the Government of the United States, which may have been
presented to either government for its interposition with the other . . . and
which yet remain unsettled, as well as any other such claims, . . . shall be
referred to two commissioners.33
Corporations were no longer considered part of the government, but instead
were seen as persons akin to private individuals. Like private individuals,
corporations under the treaty were eligible for diplomatic protection by their
30 Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, Corporations in and under International Law 7-12 (Grotius 1987)
(discussing diplomatic protection of corporations).
31 See, for example, Treaty of Commerce and Navigation Between the United States of America,
and his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, 8 Stat 398, Treaty Ser No 7 (1829); Treaty of Commerce
and Navigation Between the United States of America, and his Majesty the King of Prussia, 8 Stat
378, Treaty Set No 294 (1828); Convention of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Between
the United States of America, and the Free Hanseatic Republics of Lubeck, Bremen, and
Hamburg, 8 Stat 366, Treaty Ser No 157 (1827).
32 17 US (4 Wheat) 518 (1819) (holding unconstitutional state interference with the contract of a
corporation). See also Liam Seamus O'Melinn, Neither Contract Nor Concession: The Pubc Personality
of the Corporation, 74 Geo Wash L Rev 201, 206-16, 241-56 (2006) (discussing Dartmouth College v
Woodward).
33 Treaty with Great Britain, Art I, 10 Stat 988, Treaty Ser No 123 (1853) (emphasis added).
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governments and could therefore present their claims to the commission. Similar
language granting corporations protection under international law appeared in
other treaties of this period.3 4
Eventually, US treaties began to address some of the complexities in
defining companies and corporations. For instance, a 1911 treaty with Japan
gave broad protection to "[1]imited-liability and other companies, and
associations, commercial, industrial, and financial, already or hereafter to be
organized in accordance with the laws of either High Contracting party and
domiciled in the territories of such Party."" This language made clear that only
corporations or associations organized under the domestic law of the state
parties to the treaty could seek protection.
The solution to the problem of how to define corporate nationality was
further developed during the first half of the twentieth century. The 1924 Special
Claims Convention between the US and Mexico allowed claims for "damages
suffered by any corporation company, association or partnership in which
citizens of the US have or have had a substantial and bona fide interest."" This
extended the protection of the treaty to corporations organized under another
country's laws, but in which US investors held a substantial stake.
In any event, the pre-World War II practices of the US reflected the
growing importance of corporations as subjects of protection. Treaties
continued to single out corporations and other legal entities for protection
specifically. Hence, in a series of agreements relating to the rights of nationals in
East Africa, treaties specified that nationals of League of Nations members
would enjoy rights and that such rights would "extend equally to companies and
associations."3
Shortly after World War II, the US began including boilerplate language in
all of its FCN treaties, extending the protection of those treaties beyond natural
3 Convention between the United States of America and the Republic of Mexico, for the
Adjustment of Claims, Art I, 15 Stat 679, Treaty Ser No 212 (1868); Convention with Peru, Art I,
16 Stat 751, Treaty Ser No 281 (1868); Convention between the United States of America and the
Republic of Venezuela, Art I, 16 Stat 713, Treaty Set No 370 (1866); Convention between the
United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador, Art I, 13 Stat 631, Treaty Ser No 77
(1862).
35 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan, Art VII, 37 Stat 1504,
Treaty Ser No 558 (1911).
36 Special Claims Convention between the United States and Mexico for the Settlement of Claims of
American Citizens Arising from Revolutionary Acts in Mexico from November 20, 1910, to May
31, 1920, Art I, 43 Stat 1722, Treaty Ser No 676 (1923).
37 Convention between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Rights in the Cameroons,
Art 6, 44 Stat 2422, Treaty Ser No 743 (1925).
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persons to "corporations and associations."38 The definition of this term became
even more expansive, since it appeared to include partnerships, sole
proprietorships, and even nonprofit organizations:
As used in this Treaty the term "corporations and associations" shall mean
corporations, companies, partnerships and other associations, whether or
not with limited liability and whether or not for pecuniary profit, which
have been or may hereafter be created or organized under the applicable
laws and regulations.39
Such language eventually migrated to US treaties focusing on investment
protection, as I will discuss below. For now, it is important to note that modern
US treaty practice reflects a consistent trend of using explicit language to ensure
the protection of corporations and offers diverse specifications regarding which
corporate forms are to be eligible for protection.
B. Business Corporations and International Investment
Treaties
Although FCN treaties continued to remain important, the post-World
War II era also saw the arrival of a new type of international agreement more
tightly focused on questions of investment protection than on trade. Beginning
with the 1959 German-Pakistani and German-Dominican Bilateral Investment
Treaties (BITs),40 such agreements have grown so ubiquitous that it remains
difficult to estimate how many are in force today.41
BITs are primarily concerned with protecting the rights of foreign
investors. A typical BIT includes:
guarantees of national treatment and most-favoured nation (MFN)
treatment of investment, fair and equitable treatment, treatment in
accordance with customary international law, a guarantee of prompt,
adequate and effective compensation for expropriation, a right of free
38 See, for example, Treaty, Protocol, and Additional Protocol between the United States of America
and Italy Respecting Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Art II, 63 Stat 2255, TIAS No 1965
(1948) (US-Italy FCN); Treaty and Protocol between the United States of America and China
Respecting Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Art III, 63 Star 1299, TIAS No 1871 (1946)
(US-China FCN).
39 US-Italy FCN, Art 11:1 (cited in note 38); US-China FCN, Art 111:1 (cited in note 38).
40 See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief HistoU of International Investment Agreements, 12 UC Davis 3 Intl
L & Poly 157, 168-69 (2005).
41 A recent estimate places the number of BITs at 2,600 in 2008. See UN Conference on Trade and
Development, World Investment Report 2009: Transnational Corporations, Agricultural Prodaction and
Development 33, UN Sales No E.09.II.D.15 (2009).
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transfer of payments related to investment, and provisions for investor-State
and State-State dispute resolution. 42
What makes modern BITs different from FCNs and the claims settlement
treaties are their provisions for investor-state arbitration. These enforcement
mechanisms authorize individual investors to bring actions directly against
sovereign states. In the traditional claims settlement and FCN treaties discussed
earlier, individual claims would be brought by the person's home state, which
would formally seek damages from the offending state. The home state could
then compensate the individual claimant. In the BIT framework, the home state
has no formal role at all. The dispute is directly between the foreign investor and
the sovereign state and any compensation is paid directly to the individual.
Therefore, in an important sense, BITs grant individual investors the right to
assert claims directly against sovereign states and to enforce them in binding
arbitration tribunals.
1. Convention on the settlement of international disputes between
states and nationals of other states.
Although most investment treaties are bilateral, the Convention on the
Settlement of International Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States (Convention)43 creates a dispute settlement center to facilitate and unify
the dispute resolution processes of its state parties. Under the Convention, state
parties agree to have their investment disputes resolved in an arbitration tribunal
and to respect and enforce any judgments issued by the tribunals of the
International Centre for Settlement of International Disputes (ICSID).
Importantly, ICSID member states agree to submit to the jurisdiction of these
tribunals when foreign investors bring claims."
The classic ICSID dispute, therefore, involves a foreign investor (a non-
state actor) bringing a claim against a sovereign state. In the modern era, many
foreign investors naturally take the form of corporate entities. The ICSID state
parties, in drafting the convention, considered this problem in some detail.
From the outset, there was no doubt that the Convention drafters intended
to grant the tribunals jurisdiction over legal persons as well as natural persons.
42 UN Conference on Trade and Development, International Investment Rule-Making: Stocktaking,
Challenges and the Way Forward 11-12, UN Doc UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2007/3 (2008).
43 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States (1965), 575 UN Treaty Ser 159 (Convention).
44 There are currently 157 ICSID Convention signatories, of which 147 have deposited instruments
of ratification. List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention (ICSID May 5,
2011), online at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=Contr
actingStates&ReqFrom=Main (visited Oct 14, 2011).
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The earliest version of the Convention provision on jurisdiction made clear that
jurisdiction existed over "legal disputes between a Contracting State . . . and a
national of another Contracting State."45 A "national of a Contracting State" was
defined in the first preliminary draft as "a person natural or juridical possessing
the nationality of any Contracting State." The provision went on to specify that
the term "National" includes "(a) any company, which under the domestic law
of that State is its national, and (b) any company in which the nationals of that
State have a controlling interest." 6 In this first attempt to define the scope of
the term "juridical person," the Convention drafters immediately stumbled upon
some of the complexities of granting rights to corporations.
First, the phrase "juridical person" or "legal person" encompasses many
different types of legal entities. Corporations and companies are only one subset
of this group whose importance justified an explicit reference. But what exactly
is a "company"? The first Convention draft adopted a broad definition by
simply describing it as "any association of natural or juridical persons."4 7 This
extremely broad definition would have probably encompassed any legal entity,
including partnerships and nonprofits. Probably for that reason, it was eventually
dropped.
Second, the drafters wrestled with the problem that any juridical person is a
creature of the law of a particular state, and as such it may not be recognized
under the laws of another state. Hence, a company might be a legal person
under US law, but have no such status under foreign law. The Convention's
initial draft dealt with this problem by simply allowing ICSID jurisdiction
regardless of whether the company's legal personality was recognized under the
law of the state against which a claim was made.
Finally, the drafters of the first version wrestled with the problem of
determining the nationality of juridical persons. The provision specified that the
juridical person must have the nationality of "another Contracting State" to win
jurisdiction. The general problem facing the negotiators was that, for a typical
company, the nationality of the investors who control it might be different from
the nationality of the company itself. Yet if the nationality of a company was
limited to the place of its incorporation, foreign investors could be unable to
acquire ICSID jurisdiction when suing the state where the company they control
is registered.
45 Preliminary Draft (Doc 24), Art 2, 2 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID 1968) (ICSID Preliminary Draft).
46 Id at Art 10.
47 Id.
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The first draft simply permitted states party to have "agreed [to] treat]" a
juridical person as a "national of another Contracting State."48 After further
debate and discussion, a small majority of states party pushed through language
to specify that this exception to the nationality rule only exists if there is foreign
control of the claimant corporation.49 The second version thus bolstered the
nationality requirement for juridical persons but allowed some flexibility in
allowing otherwise ineligible juridical persons to acquire jurisdiction. This second
version was eventually adopted in what became Article 25(2) of the
Convention. 0
This brief review of Convention drafting history reveals a few important
assumptions held by the state parties negotiating the treaty. First, although it was
abundantly clear that corporations and other legal persons would likely be the
majority of investor-claimants in ICSID proceedings, the drafters nonetheless
felt compelled to specify that such non-natural persons could indeed acquire
jurisdiction. Second, in making clear that juridical persons could bring claims,
the drafters had to deal with the variety of juridical persons and the diversity of
laws that create and recognize them. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the
drafters faced the problem that in a modern corporation, there is often a
substantial difference between the investors who control or manage a
corporation and its formal legal identity.
2. Model BITs.
The Convention is only one example of how the complexity of granting
corporations rights in investment treaties was resolved. The underlying bilateral
investment agreements that typically refer disputes to ICSID also recognized the
complexities and sometimes resolved them in different ways.
For instance, the 2008 version of the German Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty does not limit the investors who may seek protection to juridical persons
with legal personality. Rather, "any juridical person and any commercial or other
company or association with or without legal personality" may qualify under the
treaty.5 ' This broader scope of protection, however, is limited to entities that are
48 First Draft (Doc 43), Art 30, 1 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID 1968).
49 Revised Draft (Doc 123), Art 28, 2 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID 1968).
50 Convention, Art 25(2) (cited in note 43).
51 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty of the Federal Republic of Germany, Art 1(3) (2008), online at
http://italaw.com/documents/2008-GermanModelBIT.doc (visited Oct 14, 2011).
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"founded pursuant to the law of a Member State of the European Union ... and
. organized pursuant to the law" of Germany.5 2
Other states, however, take a different approach. Some, like France, require
the existence of legal personality recognized under the laws of the contracting
state as well as the entity's having its principal place of business (or head office)
in that state.s" Others, like Colombia or Norway, have a similar approach but
only require that the legal person have "substantial business activities" in the
territory of the contracting party.5 4
The US Model BIT offers what is likely the broadest and most generous
definition of a protected corporation:
"[E]nterprise" means any entity constituted or organized under applicable
law, whether or not for profit, and whether privately or governmentally
owned or controlled, including a corporation, trust, partnership, sole
proprietorship, joint venture, association, or similar organization; and a
branch of an enterprise.
"[Enterprise of a Party" means an enterprise constituted or organized
under the law of a Party, and a branch located in the territory of a Party and
carrying out business activities there.55
This definition, which appears in the US Model BIT and in the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)," attempts to account for the diversity of legal
entities. Hence the many organizational forms that receive protection under US
treaties.
3. Summary.
Perhaps no area of international law has dealt with corporations as rights-
holders more than international investment law. Building upon the tradition of
claims settlement and FCN treaties, international investment treaties have
specified that companies and other legal persons are eligible for protection in
certain circumstances and under certain conditions. The different formulations
52 Id.
53 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty of France, Art I (2006), online at
http://italaw.com/documents/ModelTreatyFrance2006.pdf (visited Oct 14, 2011).
54 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty of Colombia, Art I (2007), online at
http://italaw.com/documents/inv-modelbit_colombia.pdf (visited Sept 23, 2011); Model
Bilateral Investment Treaty of Norway, Art 1 (2007), online at
http://italaw.com/documents/NorwayModel2007.doc (visited Nov 10, 2011).
5s Model Bilateral Investment Treaty of the United States, Art I (2004), online at
http://italaw.com/documents/USmodelbitnov04.pdf (Oct 14, 2011); North American Free
Trade Agreement (1992), Art 201, 32 ILM 289 (1993) (NAFTA). See also Agreement Establishing
the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area, Ch 8 Art II (2009), online at
http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/aanzfta/aanzfta.PDF (visited Oct 14, 2011).
56 NAFTA (cited in note 55).
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they have taken reflect some of the complexities of granting corporations and
other legal entities rights. It is worth noting that resolving such complications
has not been, by and large, the product of judicial interpretation or scholarly
development. Rather, the rights of corporations generally have been drawn from
formal treaty provisions.
IV. CORPORATE RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW
International human rights law has also recognized the rights of
corporations in some circumstances. But the manner in which it has done so is
quite different from the development of corporate rights under international
investment law. Absent the type of textual authorization found in international
investment treaties, corporate rights have developed in significantly different
ways.
A. European Convention on Human Rights
Without a doubt, the acceptance of corporate rights under international
human rights law is most apparent in the jurisprudence of the European Court
of Human Rights (Strasbourg Court) in its interpretation of the ECHR. Indeed,
no other international tribunal authorized to interpret human rights law has
protected corporate rights in a similar fashion, and few have even considered the
possibility. For this reason, the ECHR is the best and most illustrative example
of how contemporary human rights law has been invoked to protect
corporations."
For our purposes, it is useful to compare the development of corporate
rights under the ECHR with the development of corporate rights under
international investment law. Although the ECHR does have some textual basis
for protecting corporate rights, that textual guidance is not quite as clear or as
detailed as that typically found in international investment treaties. For this
reason, judicial interpretations have proven to be key in the development of
corporate rights under the ECHR.
1. The textual basis for corporate rights under the ECHR.
The main substantive provisions of the ECHR do not specifically refer to
legal or natural persons. Rather, they refer either to "persons" or simply to
"everyone." For instance, Article 1 requires states to "secure to everyone within
their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this
5 See Emberland, The Human Rghts of Companies 2-4 (cited in note 6).
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Convention."" Other articles follow this language. Article 2 holds that
"[e]veryone's right to life shall be protected by law."" Sometimes, the
protections are phrased in the negative. Article 3, for instance, states, "[n]o one
shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.""o Still other provisions are phrased without any specific object of
protection. Article 14's non-discrimination requirement simply holds that the
"enjoyment of the rights" of the ECHR "shall be secured without
discrimination."6 1
Article 10 does provide some textual basis for protecting certain kinds of
business enterprises, at least by implication. In the course of ensuring that
"everyone has the right to freedom of expression," Article 10(1)'s last sentence
ensures that such a right does not prevent states from licensing "broadcasting,
television or cinema enterprises."62 If such media enterprises had no protection
under Article 10, it seems unlikely that the last sentence carving out licensing
would have been necessary.
One other provision of the Convention explicitly refers to the difference
between natural and legal persons. Article 1 in Protocol 1 of the Convention
states, "[e]very natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general
principles of international law.63 It is perhaps unsurprising that the only
provision of the ECHR to specify protection for legal persons is the legal right
most closely linked to international investment law. Although phrased somewhat
differently, the ECHR's protection of "possessions" in Article 1 is analogous to
the standard BIT provision protecting investor property against expropriation.
There is a third provision that does provide substantial textual support for
the inclusion of companies within the ECHR. In Article 25, the ECHR grants
the European Commission (and later the Court in amended Article 34) the right
to receive petitions from "from any person, non-governmental organization or
group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High
Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in this Convention." 64 Although not
explicitly granting a substantive right to legal entities, it plainly suggests that the
58 ECHR, Art 1 (cited in note 5) (emphasis added).
59 Id at Art 2.
60 Id at Art 3.
61 Id at Art 14.
62 ECHR, Art 10 (cited in note 5).
63 Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art
1, 213 UN Treaty Set 262 (1952).
64 ECHR, Arts 25, 34 (cited in note 5).
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drafters expected petitions from victims seeking enforcement of the Convention
to come from legal entities as well as from individuals.
In sum, two substantive provisions of the ECHR specifically refer to legal
entities, but only one explicitly guarantees their inclusion within the
Convention's protection. The other substantive provisions are generally phrased
and do not specifically indicate an intent by the ECHR's drafters one way or the
other with respect to legal persons. The inclusion of "non-governmental
organizations" within the list of entities authorized to bring enforcement
petitions under the ECHR does provide substantial textual support for the view
that corporate entities should have rights under the agreement. Still, a strict
reading of the text might limit the protection of legal entities to only a few or
even a single substantive provision.
2. The jurisprudential development of corporate rights under the
ECHR.
The Strasbourg Court has not hesitated to extend ECHR protections to
corporations and other legal entities. Indeed, it has largely done so without
bothering to offer extensive formal justifications.
For instance, in the 1984 decision A v Austia," the Court noted simply
that the "freedom of assembly under Art. 11 . . . can be exercised [ ] by the
organizer of a meeting, even it if should be a legal person."" Such analysis was
uncontroversial and apparently uncontested within the Court, even though
Article 11 does not make any specific reference to legal entities or legal persons.
Similarly, the Court had little difficulty in finding that corporations,
especially media corporations, enjoy the right of free expression under Article
10. In AutronicAG v Switterland, the Court opined:
[Neither Autronic AG's legal status as a limited company nor the fact that
its activities were commercial nor the intrinsic nature of freedom of
expression can deprive Autronic AG of the protection of Article 10. The
Article applies to "everyone", whether natural or legal persons. 68
The Court went on to note that it had allowed similar claims by companies
under Article 10 before without controversy, or even discussion." Indeed, the
idea that companies and other entities qualify for protection under the ECHR
65 App No 9905/82, 7 Eur HR Rep 137 (1985).
66 Id at 138.
67 App No 12726/87, 12 Eur HR Rep 485 (1990).
68 Id at 499 (citations omitted).
69 See Gmppera Radio AG v Switzerland, App No 10890/84, 12 Eur Ct HR 321 (1990); Markt Intern
Verlag GMBH & Beermann v Germany, App No 10572/83, 12 Eur HR Rep 161 (1989); Sunday
Times v United Kingdom, App No 6538/74, 2 Eur HR Rep 245 (1979).
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has been so accepted within the Strasbourg court's jurisprudence that there is
literally no discussion on the question in court opinions. Even a leading
commentator notes that the Court has "not developed a corporate theory for the
ECHR."70
That being said, the ECHR has confronted at least one difficult problem
that has also faced international investment law. In many circumstances,
shareholders of a corporation have sought to assert rights even though the
"victim," for the purposes of Article 34, is the corporate entity. In other words,
the Court has been asked to "pierce the corporate veil" to allow shareholders to
assert rights on behalf of the corporation.
The division of power between the shareholders and the corporation is
similar to the problem Convention negotiators considered when determining
whether foreign-controlled corporations could invoke jurisdiction. Unlike most
international investment treaties, however, there is no guidance in the text of the
ECHR itself on how to resolve this problem. In Agrotexim v Greece, the Court
refused to accept an application by six companies who were shareholders in
another corporation that had suffered liquidation by the Greek government. The
Court dismissed the application, finding that "disregarding of a company's legal
personality will be justified only in exceptional circumstances, in particular where
it is clearly established that it is impossible for the company to apply to the
Convention institutions through the organs set up under its articles of
incorporation." 7 2
The scope of Agrotexim has been questioned, since it is not clear whether it
applies outside the context of Protocol 1 of Article 1. And it explicitly disagreed
with the view of the European Commission, which argued that both the
shareholders and the corporation should be able to bring petitions. But
Agrotexim appears to continue to be followed, and the ECHR generally disallows
"veil piercing" to benefit shareholders except in extraordinary circumstances.
In sum, ECHR jurisprudence provides the richest example of corporate
protection under international human rights law. The textual basis for corporate
rights under the ECHR is fairly robust, and, as I will argue, unique compared to
other international treaties. In any event, the modern interpretation of the
ECHR has accepted corporate rights without any serious debate and has even
70 Emberland, The Human Rights of Companies at 66 (cited in note 6).
71 App No 14807/89, 21 Eur HR Rep 250 (1996).
72 Id at 284.
73 See, for example, G] v Luxembourg, App No 21156/93, 36 Eur HR Rep 750 (2003) (finding that
extraordinary circumstances were met when a company was undergoing liquidation). See also
Emberland, The Human Rights of Companies at 78-79 (cited in note 6).
Winter 2012
Ku
749
Chicago Journal of International Law
begun to wrestle with some of the difficult questions regarding corporate
shareholders already encountered by international investment treaties.
3. Other international human rights treaties.
As I noted earlier, the ECHR is the only international human rights treaty
system that has explicitly recognized corporate rights. The other leading
international human rights treaties have not followed the lead of the European
Court of Human Rights.
Unlike the ECHR, the ICCPR does not have any specific references to
legal persons or legal entities. In fact, several provisions of the ICCPR make
reference to human beings in particular. Thus, Article 6 declares that, "Every
human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law.
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life."74 Article 3's equal rights
provisions similarly specify the "equal right[s] of men and women."75
Still, the language of some provisions does provide room for corporate
protection. Article 19, for instance, protects the right of "everyone" to freedom
of expression.76 In at least one report on this provision, the Human Rights
Committee (the Committee) of the ICCPR has argued that some corporate
rights may be inextricably linked to an individual human being's right so as to
qualify for protection: "The Committee notes that the Covenant rights, which
are at issue in the present communication, and in particular the right of freedom
of expression, are by their nature inalienably linked to the person."7
On the other hand, unlike the ECHR, the ICCPR system for hearing
petitions is limited to individuals only." Thus, although certain ICCPR rights
might protect corporate entities, no petitions can be raised by corporate entities
in the ICCPR system. The American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)
allows collective entities to bring petitions, but only on behalf of a natural
71person.
74 ICCPR, Art 6 (cited in note 6).
75 Id at Art 3.
76 Id at Art 19.
77 UN Human Rights Committee, Communication No 455/1991, UN Doc
CCPR/C/51/D/455/1991 at 8 (1994).
78 UN Human Rights Committee, A Newspaper Publishing Company v Trinidad and Tobago,
Communication No 360/1989, UN Doc Supp No 40 (44/A/40) at 310 (1989).
79 See Tabacalera Boquer6n SA v Paraguay, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, Doc 6, Inter-Am CHR 225 (1997).
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V. THE LIMITS OF CORPORATE RIGHTS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
As the prior discussion indicates, corporations have won rights under both
international investment treaties and international human rights treaties. In this
section, I argue that the development of corporate rights under these two bodies
of law does not support treating corporations as full "subjects" of international
law. Moreover, these bodies of law reveal some important complexities raised by
the provision of corporate rights. Such complexities include the diversity of
corporate forms and the division between investors and management. Resolving
such complexities requires policy choices by international lawmakers for which
there seems to be little consensus under international law.
A. Subjects and Rights
Although corporate rights have developed in both international investment
law and international human rights law, the manner of their development offers
limited support for corporate rights under international law.
As I discussed in Section III, the protection of corporations in
international law coincided with the rise of independent corporations during the
nineteenth century. Prior to the postwar BITs, corporations began to appear in
treaties as subjects of protection alongside natural persons.
Importantly, the rights granted to corporations were not typically
recognized until they were explicitly added to the text of treaties. Early claims
settlement treaties allowed states to offer diplomatic protection to their
nationals. Later, companies and corporations were added and came within the
scope of a sovereign's diplomatic protection.
International human rights law has a more complicated relationship with
corporate rights. Unlike international investment treaties, the protection of
corporate rights varies depending on the type of international human rights
instrument. The only system that has fully embraced corporate rights is the
ECHR. Unlike the international investment treaties, the basis of corporate rights
under international human rights law has not been based entirely on explicit
textual recognition. Although there is a sound textual basis for some corporate
protection, the Strasbourg Court has also inferred corporate rights for some
substantive provisions that lack the same textual basis.
Still, it is worth noting that only the ECHR system actually recognizes
corporate rights, in contrast to all of the other international human rights treaty
systems. The difference between the ECHR and other international agreements
can be explained most easily by the lack of textual support in treaties like the
ICCPR or the ACHR for corporate rights. This disparate treatment is suggestive
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of the limited acceptance of corporate rights within international human rights
law.
B. The Practical Complexities of Granting Corporate Rights
The limited development of corporate rights under international law may
also be explained in part by some of the complexities that must be overcome to
recognize such rights. As both international investment and international human
rights tribunals have realized, granting corporate rights requires the resolution of
issues unique to corporations. There are two practical issues that any system of
corporate rights must resolve.
1. The separation of ownership and control.
One problem that has been repeatedly faced by international tribunals
when considering corporate rights has been the division of rights and interests
between a corporation's shareholders and its management. This fundamental
problem was considered in great detail by the International Court of Justice (JCJ)
in the well-known Barcelona Traction Case.80 In that case, the ICJ held that the
nationality of the company, for the purposes of diplomatic protection, should be
determined by the place of incorporation. The nationality of the shareholders,
even that of the majority of the shareholders, could not determine the nationality
of the corporation.8 1
As noted above, this approach has been followed by the European Court
of Human Rights. The Barcelona Traction court, however, did leave itself the
possibility of ignoring the corporate form in some extraordinary circumstances.82
And many international investment law tribunals have seemed more willing to
disregard the corporate form in favor of the shareholders' nationality when
determining corporate nationality for the purposes of jurisdiction.
For instance, one ICSID tribunal allowed such a shareholder group to
satisfy the tribunal's jurisdiction requirements, finding that there was nothing in
"general international law" prohibiting treaties that allowed shareholders to
bring claims, even shareholders who held only minority and noncontrolling
stakes. 3 In an earlier proceeding of the same dispute, the tribunal held that
recognizing shareholders' rights to bring a claim made sense so as to not have
80 Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, Ught & Power Co (Beig v Spa), 1970 ICJ 3 (Feb 5, 1970).
81 Id at 38.
82 Id at 39-40. Indeed, it appears to have done so sub silenio in a later judgment involving US
shareholders in an Italian corporation. See Case Concerning Eletronica Sicula S.p.A (ELSI) (US v Ita),
1989 ICJ 15 (July 20, 1989).
83 CMS Gas Transmission Co v Argenine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/01 /8, Decision of Sept 25,
2007, 46 ILM 1136, 1144-45.
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the corporate personality interfering with the protection of the real interests
associated with the investment.84 Other tribunals have reached similar results.85
2. Diversity of corporate forms.
Unlike humans, corporations and other legal entities come in various
shapes and sizes for legal purposes. Within US domestic law, for instance,
corporate entities might take the form of a standard corporation, a limited
liability corporation, limited liability partnerships, limited partnerships, trusts,
non-profit associations, sole proprietorships or other entities. Moreover, these
forms may differ from state to state.
Such diversity is only compounded in the international context. Here, the
structure and diversity of corporate forms is even greater. Globally, there are
civil law and common law systems, post-socialist and developing states, among
other varieties. Such diversity poses a problem when granting rights protection.
It is not an insoluble problem, however. For instance, as we have seen, US BITs
recognize a variety of corporate forms. The ECHR has even broader language
recognizing petitions from any non-governmental organization.
Any general rule of international law recognizing corporate rights will have
to determine what kind of legal persons can hold these rights. As we have seen,
different areas of law have developed different approaches to resolving this
question. But no uniform approach has emerged, further confirming the
challenges facing a general rule favoring protection of corporate rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
It has almost become conventional wisdom among international human
rights scholars that corporations should be treated as full subjects under
international law. This view has developed largely from the extensive academic
literature examining corporate duties under international law. The argument for
corporate duties is stronger if corporations can be considered full subjects of
international law. But if they are subjects, then corporations should enjoy rights
under international law as well.
This Article offers reasons to doubt the assumption that corporations have
already achieved rights under general international law. Corporate rights under
international law first emerged indirectly when states included corporate entities
as nationals entitled to diplomatic protection in treaties. Corporations never
84 CMS Gas Transmission Co v Republic ofArgentina, ICSID Case No ARB/01/8, Decision of July 17,
2003, 42 ILM 788, 794-95.
85 See Mihaly International Corporation v Democratic SociaRst Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No
ARB/00/2, Award of Mar 15, 2002, 41 ILM 867, 870-71; Wena Hotels Limited v Arab Republic of
Egypt, ICSID Case No ARB/98/4, Proceedings of May 25,1999, 41 ILM 881, 888-89.
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achieved direct rights under international law until the postwar development of
international investment law. Corporate rights were granted in such treaties by
specific textual references and therefore never generated much controversy.
The story is similar when one looks to international human rights law.
Only the ECHR has been interpreted to allow corporations to invoke rights,
while other treaty systems have largely rejected the idea. Even the ECHR,
however, bases most of its decisions to recognize corporate rights on specific
textual provisions.
In any event, granting corporate rights requires policymakers to resolve
numerous pragmatic and functional issues. Chief among these is dealing with the
diversity of corporate forms and the separation of ownership and control, not
only within a particular legal system but also among different legal systems. The
BIT system, which contains by far the most detailed treatment of these and
other questions, has not achieved a uniformly accepted approach on either of
these issues.
For these reasons, there is little basis for the claim that corporations should
presumptively bear rights under international law. In fact, such rights have
emerged carefully, and largely with firm textual foundations in treaty agreements.
Corporations may one day achieve subjecthood and presumptively exercise their
rights on the international stage, but that day is still far off.
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